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Mental Influences on States of the Body and Brain (Psychogenesis) 
Within current Western philosophy, science and clinical practice it is largely taken for 
granted that physical causes can have physical effects and even that physical causes 
can have mental effects, for example in the way that changes in body and brain can 
produce changes in consciousness. However, within conventional Western 
materialism, that mental causes can have mental effects and even physical effects is 
often regarded as theoretically problematic (see R20, R21, R64). The evidence for 
mental influences on states of the body and brain (psychogenesis) is nevertheless 
extensive.   
Psyhosomatics and Psychogenesis 
Anees Sheikh et al (2003—R68) provide a brief history of psychosomatics (the view 
that psychological factors are capable of causing bodily illness and disease), and then 
gives an extensive, but succinct review of research on the physiological 
consequences of meditation, imagery, biofeedback, and hypnosis on body states. 
They review the effects of meditation on cardiopulmonary responses, electrodermal 
changes, electroencephalographic effects, and numerous other physiological effects 
ranging from decline in adrenocortical activity, decreased cortisol secretion, and 
increased urinary metabolite serotonin, to the amelioration of a variety of health 
problems such as asthma, insomnia, severe migraine and cluster headaches.  They 
go on to review the effects of mental imagery on the control of heart rate, blood 
pressure, blood flow, sexual response (e.g. penis engorgement), body chemistry (e.g. 
changes in salivary pH with taste images), ocular response (e.g. pupil dilation), 
electrodermal and electromyographic activity, and effects on the immune system. 
They briefly review the extensive research on the effects of biofeedback on 
cardiovascular and cardiopulmonary changes, gastrointestinal motility, brain 
rhythms, striate muscle activity, blood flow to various parts of the body, blood 
glucose and insulin levels, and immune system functioning along with evidence for 
the therapeutic uses of this technique. They then give a brief review of the effects of 
hypnosis and its close association with imagery. In conclusion, they stress the need 
to develop more inclusive models of human mind/body interactions that can make 
better sense of such extensive evidence than materialist-reductionist models can 
provide. 
Hypnosis 
The study of hypnosis can be traced back to the theory and practice of animal 
magnetism by F. A. Mesmer at the end of the 18th century. In his instructive review, 
Etzel Cardeña (2014—R69) focuses specifically on how studies of hypnosis have 
influenced our understanding of altered states of consciousness. He begins with a 
historical introduction to different ways of categorizing such altered states and the 
particular contribution that studies of hypnosis made to developing procedures for 
both creating such states and psychological instruments to measure them, such as 
the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI; Pekala, 1991), which has been 
used in research on hypnosis, meditation, out-of-body experiences, and ﬁre-walking, 
among others (Cardeña & Pekala, 2014). Experienced changes in these states are 
wide-ranging. For example, in studies using the PCI, highly hypnotizable individuals 
have reported signiﬁcant alterations in body image, sense of time, perception, and 
meaning; a sense of an altered state of awareness; increases in affect, attentional 
focus, and amount and vividness of imagery; and decreases in self-awareness, 
rationality, voluntary control, and memory. An important early contribution to the 
study of consciousness was the notion that an ostensible hypnotic state is not 
homogeneous but that it varies according to what came to be known as the depth of 
the state. Just as sleep has different psychophysiological states or stages, the 
hypnotic state can be analyzed according to varying levels of depth. This, in turn, 
enabled the study of the neurodynamics accompanying such transitions, the study of 
individual differences in hypnotisability and so on. Studies have also revealed 
equiﬁnality and heterogeneity—that similar states can be arrived at by different 
subjects following different trajectories—a principle that might also apply to other 
altered states (for example the different routes by which different meditators arrive 
at equivalent meditative states). Cardeña then evaluates the evidence that hypnosis 
can enhance a range of human potentialities, ranging from the well-established 
finding that it can be used in the control of pain to the less well-established claims 
that it can enable accurate recall of otherwise inaccessible memories or enhance 
parapsychological abilities such as telepathy, clairvoyance and so on. He also reviews 
the evidence for how hypnotism can produce various dissociations in consciousness, 
supporting a neo-dissociation model of the mind with multiple nonconscious control 
and supervisory processes, relevant not only to hypnosis but to psychology as a 
whole. Finally, he reviews the powerful influence of sociocultural setting (the 
hypnotist-participant relationship, cultural beliefs, expectations etc.) on hypnotic 
effects—again relevant to studies of consciousness in general, and to psychology as 
a whole.   
 
Placebos 
 
The most widely accepted evidence for the effect of states of mind on medical 
outcomes is undoubtedly the placebo effect—well know to every medical 
practitioner and researcher. Simply receiving treatment and having confidence in the 
therapy or therapist has itself been found to be therapeutic in many clinical 
situations, and this has generated an extensive literature not only on how to control 
for such effects in clinical trials, but also on how such effects operate, and how to 
harness them for the benefit of patients.  
 
In an excellent review of the literature, Finniss, Kaptchuk, Miller and Benedetti 
2010—R70) examine the biological mechanisms, clinical applications and ethical 
issues associated with such effects. They clarify the various definitions of placebo 
and their role in randomised control trials (RCTs), pointing out that rather than there 
being just one placebo effect, there are many placebos and consequent effects, 
involving a range of psychological processes, including expectation, conditioning, 
learning, memory, motivation, somatic focus, reward, anxiety reduction and 
meaning. Of these, the consequences of manipulating the expectation that a given 
treatment will elicit a given response, and the effects of classical conditioning have 
been particularly well researched and well supported. Neurobiological studies also 
demonstrate multiple placebo effects on different physiological systems both in 
healthy volunteers and in patients with many different clinical conditions. For 
example, placebo analgesia has been found to operate via both opioid and non-
opioid mechanisms. It can be reversed by the opioid antagonist naloxone, and it can 
be enhanced by a cholecystokinin (CCK) antagonist, suggesting that CCK normally 
acts as a placebo analgesia inhibitor. They go on to review studies relevant to 
application of placebos in clinical practice, for example in studies that demonstrated 
ritual placebo administration to be more effective when it was accompanied by a 
supportive clinical relationship.  Patient extraversion, agreeableness, and openness 
to experience were additional contributory factors. Different placebo rituals (e.g. 
placebo acupuncture versus placebo pills) also had different effects, and the same 
applied to nocebo effects (where patients were told that the treatment might have 
adverse side-effects). Strong placebo effects are also found in “open-hidden” 
treatment paradigms using conventional treatments where no placebo is 
administered. Treatments are found to be more effective when given in a routine 
(open) way where patients know that the treatment is being administered than in a 
hidden way, for example where patients know a drug will be administered by a 
pump, but they don’t know when the drug is given. Placebo is also enhanced not just 
by patient expectations, but also the positive expectations of the practitioner. 
Finniss et al go on to discuss the complex ethical issues surrounding the harnessing 
of placebo effects in clinical practice, for example whether placebos can be 
administered without deception, and whether it is ethical to promote a placebo as a 
potentially beneficial treatment.  
 
Psychoneuroimmunology 
 
From the 1980s there was an explosion of interest in the ways that emotions and 
behavior can affect immune system functioning requiring a fuller understanding of the 
interconnections and reciprocal control between cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic 
and immune systems.  These have been extensively investigated within 
psychoneuroimmunology (PNI)—and, following a detailed review of the early research, 
Watkins (1997) concluded that  
 
“It is apparent that the immune system can no longer be thought of as 
autoregulatory.  Virtually every aspect of immune function can be modulated by 
the autonomic nervous system and centrally produced neuropeptides.  These 
efferent neuroimmunomodulatory pathways are themselves modulated by 
afferent inputs from the immune system, the cortex and the limbic emotional 
centers.  Thus the brain and the immune system communicate in a complex 
bidirectional flow of cytokines, steroids and neuropeptides, sharing information 
and regulating each other’s function.  This enables the two systems to respond in 
an integrated manner to environmental challenges, be they immunological or 
behavioral, and thereby maintain homeostatic balance.” (p. 15) 
 
In a subsequent, authoritative review, Kiecolt-Glaser et al (2002—R71) focus on the 
many ways in which psychological states affect immune functioning. They survey the 
effects of both laboratory induced and naturally occurring short and long-term 
stressors, negative affective states (ranging from acute depression, to transient mood 
changes induced by laboratory manipulations), the positive effects of supportive social 
relationships and the negative effect of dysfunctional ones, and the associations 
between personality, coping style and immune functioning. They go on to review 
research on PNI intervention strategies including hypnosis, relaxation, exercise, 
classical conditioning, self-disclosure, exposure to a phobic stressor to enhance 
perceived coping self-efficacy, and cognitive–behavioral therapies with a range of 
populations. They then consider the effects of psychological variables on immune 
responses to infectious disease, cancer, wound healing, autoimmune diseases, and 
HIV—and conclude with a discussion of explanatory biological models and directions 
for future research. 
Altered States of Consciousness 
In his introduction to altered states of consciousness (ASC) Ludwig (1966—R72) 
defines them as “any mental state(s), induced by various physiological, 
psychological, or pharmacological maneuvers or agents, which can be recognized 
subjectively by the individual himself (or by an objective observer of the individual) 
as representing a sufficient deviation in subjective experience or psychological 
functioning from certain general norms for that individual during alert, waking 
consciousness.” (p. 225). Such states may be either pathological or not pathological, 
and in his paper he aims to determine (a) the conditions necessary for their 
emergence, (b) the factors that influence their outward manifestations, 
(c) their relatedness and/or common denominators, and (d)  their adaptive or 
maladaptive functions. He reviews the many triggers of ASCs, ranging from sensory 
and social isolation, profound emotional arousal in ritually induced and other trance 
states, and pathological states that include fugues, amnesias, traumatic neuroses, 
depersonalization, panic states, rage reactions, hysterical conversion reactions  
bewitchment, demoniacal  possession states, and acute psychotic states, such as 
schizophrenia. ASCs may also arise from prolonged, heightened mental involvement 
and absorption, or from a “passive state of mind” in which active goal-directed 
thinking is minimal—a precursor in the latter case of mystical, transcendental and 
revelatory states such as satori and samadhi.  They may also arise through 
alterations in body chemistry or neurophysiology, for example from administration 
of anesthetics and psychedelic, narcotic, sedative, and stimulant drugs. From studies 
that compared hypnosis with effects of LSD-25 Ludwig then reviews evidence of 
common features such as alterations in thinking, disturbed time sense, loss of 
control, body image change, perceptual distortions, sense of the ineffable, and 
feelings of rejuvenation. He then considers the functions of ASCs, ranging from 
maladaptive expressions in the neuroses and psychoses, to adaptive expressions in 
healing shamanic, spiritual and psychotherapeutic practices, or in the pursuit of new 
knowledge, inspiration, or experience, for example in the realm of religion, 
meditation, revelatory and prophetic states, and mystical and transcendental 
experiences.  
 
In his introduction to his two-volume edited work on Altering Consciousness: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Etzel Cardeña (2011—R73) provides an excellent 
summary of the basic concepts and common misunderstanding of ASCs, starting 
with an evaluation of its varied definitions. He gives a brief survey of the history of 
different ASC classification systems and points out that, although a number of useful 
systems exist, given the vast range of ASCs and the limits of current understanding, 
none are entirely satisfactory. He stresses the importance of distinguishing the 
characterization of an ASC from the procedure(s) that can induce it, that ASCs are 
dynamic rather than static, and that there are individual differences in how and 
whether these can be produced under given circumstances. He goes on to ask why 
we should study such states, and argues (following James—R80) that no 
understanding of consciousness or of reality itself can be complete without, in some 
way, taking these into account; within clinical practice it is also important to 
distinguish maladaptive ASCs from those that may be of benefit to long-term 
psychological health.  Cardeña then introduces the many ways such states have been 
studied, surveyed in the chapters of his two-volume collection. 
 
In the final reading in this section, Frank Larøi, et al (2014) provide an insightful 
review of cultural influences on the nature, prevalence, meaning and treatment of 
ASCs, focusing specifically on hallucinations in a way that draws on both 
psychological and anthropological research. They argue that that culture has a 
significant impact on the experience, understanding, and labeling of hallucinations, 
which may have important theoretical, as well as clinical consequences. Culture can 
affect what is identified as a hallucination, and produce different patterns of 
hallucination among both clinical and nonclinical populations. Hallucinations are 
often culturally meaningful, and occur at different rates in different settings. Culture 
also affects the meaning and characteristics of hallucinations associated with 
psychosis, and cultural variations of psychotic hallucinations may have implications 
for the clinical outcome of those who struggle with psychosis. They conclude that a 
clinician should never assume that the mere report of what seems to be a 
hallucination is necessarily a symptom of pathology and that the patient’s cultural 
background needs to be taken into account when assessing and treating such 
symptoms. 
 
Studies of the Nature and Effects of Meditation 
 
Studies of the physiological effects of meditation and various Yogic practices dating 
back to the 1950s and 1960s investigated the ways in which such practices can alter 
physiological functions. However, many of these studies were poorly controlled. The 
relatively detailed, well-controlled study by Wallace, Benson and Wilson (1971—
R75) on the effects of transcendental meditation (TM) on physiological changes was 
consequently seminal.  As they noted, hypermetabolic physiological states, with 
increased oxygen consumption, normally accompany anticipated stressful situations. 
However, hypometabolic physiological states, other than those occurring during 
sleep and hibernation, are more difficult to produce. Nevertheless, transcendental 
meditation did produce such states, marked by respiratory changes consisting of 
decreased O2 consumption, CO2 elimination, respiratory rate, and minute 
ventilation, with no change in respiratory quotient. Arterial blood pH and blood 
lactate also decreased. Conversely, skin resistance markedly increased and the EEG 
showed an increase in the intensity of slow alpha waves with occasional theta-wave 
activity. This pattern of changes differed both from sleep and those produced by 
hypnosis. Wallace et al review evidence that some of these changes can also be 
produced with biofeedback using operant conditioning procedures, but note that 
with TM no biofeedback is involved. They conclude that TM provides one route by 
which such hypometabolic states can be produced, but left open the possibility that 
such states could be produced by other practices—leading to an extended program 
of research into what Benson (1975) later termed the Relaxation Response. 
 
A similarly seminal study into the therapeutic uses of meditation was carried by  
Jon Kabat-Zinn (1982—R76), which launched the current interest in the uses of 
mindfulness meditation in clinical practice, starting with its use in a 10-week stress 
and relaxation program for alleviating chronic pain. This appeared to cause an 
"uncoupling" of the sensory dimension of the pain experience from the affective/ 
evaluative alarm reaction and reduce the experience of suffering via cognitive 
reappraisal. The technique was then developed into Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) and applied to many other clinical conditions such as stress, 
anxiety and depression. Since the establishment of MBSR, several other 
interventions have also been developed using mindfulness-related principles and 
practices, including Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2002), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) and Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999)—see R79 below.  
 
The recent explosion of interest in meditation in Western culture, science and 
therapeutic practice had many additional sources, surveyed by Eugene Taylor 
(1997—R77) in his Introduction to M. Murphy, S. Donovan and E. Taylor’s extensive 
bibliography of research on the physical and psychological effects of meditation. He 
briefly reviews its origins in various Eastern traditions, stressing the importance of 
understanding how given techniques are culturally embedded in particular spiritual 
traditions and historical times, and contextualized by the philosophies of those 
traditions and/or specific teachers. He then gives a fascinating history of the infusion 
of Eastern ideas to America from before the American Revolution, influencing the 
Declaration of Independence, and, in the 19th Century, the Spiritualists, 
Transcendentalists and Theosophists. From 1893 (at the World Parliament of 
Religions, held in Chicago), Vivekananda introduced the philosophy underlying, and 
practice of meditation, as did many subsequent Asian teachers including Yogananda, 
Krisnamurti, Suzuki, and Aurobindo Ghose. The 1960s led to a further explosion of 
interest in meditation and spiritual practices fueled by experimentation with the 
mind expanding drugs mescaline and LSD, and a new influx of teachers from Asia to 
the West, stimulated in part by the increasing influence of communism in India and 
Korea, and by the Chinese invasion of Mongolia and Tibet.  
 
Following the widespread ban on the use of psychedelics in 1967, Taylor then traces 
the institutionalization of Asian meditative practices and associated traditions in 
America from the 1970s onwards along with the emergence of a new generation of 
Western practitioners who themselves became teachers, finding ways of 
accommodating Eastern methods to the West. Taylor then turns to the 
development, in subsequent years, of the scientific study of meditation, pointing out 
the difficulties of accommodation such Eastern practices to a Western scientific 
mindset. In spite of this, examination of its physiological, psychological, and 
behavioral effects flourished, and Murphy, Donovan and Taylor’s bibliography, The 
Physical and Psychological Effects of Meditation traces these developments, focusing 
particularly on research with Transcendental Meditation, Benson’s work on the 
Relaxation Response along with its subsequent developments, and the research on 
Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction, originated by Kabat Zin. Extensive programs 
were also developed to incorporate meditative techniques into cognitive-
behavioural therapy, health psychology and a range of complementary medicines. In 
conclusion Taylor focuses on broad theoretical questions, pointing out the 
difficulties of fully understanding such practices within a reductionist, scientific 
worldview, and the consequent need to develop a more inclusive, integrative 
approach.  
 
The emergence of brain imaging techniques opened up new possibilities for studying 
the effects of meditation on neural dynamics, and Lutz et al (2008—R78) provide an 
excellent review of research that focuses on the mental processes and underlying 
neural circuitry involved in two styles of meditation. One style, Focused Attention 
(FA) meditation, entails the voluntary focusing of attention on a chosen object. The 
other style, Open Monitoring (OM) meditation, involves non-reactive monitoring of 
the content of experience from moment to moment. They also discuss the potential 
regulatory functions of these practices on attention and emotion processes as well 
as their potential long-term impact on the brain and behavior. 
 
In recent years there has been widespread interest in the potential benefits of 
mindfulness, a particular form of meditative attentiveness, and in the final reading in 
this section Keng, Smoski, and Robins (2011—R79) provide an extensive, 
authoritative review of research on the effects of mindfulness on psychological 
health. They begin with a discussion of mindfulness as a theoretical construct, noting 
that the term may be used to describe a psychological trait, a practice that can be 
cultivated (e.g., mindfulness meditation), a mode or state of awareness, or a 
psychological process. They discuss differences between Buddhist and Western 
psychological conceptualizations of mindfulness, and how mindfulness has been 
integrated into Western medicine and psychology. They then review three areas of 
research: cross-sectional, correlational research on the associations between 
mindfulness and various indicators of psychological health; intervention research on 
the effects of mindfulness-oriented interventions, such as MBSR, MBCT, DBT and 
ACT on psychological health; and laboratory-based, experimental research on the 
immediate effects of mindfulness inductions on emotional and behavioral 
functioning. They conclude that mindfulness brings about various positive 
psychological effects, including increased subjective well being, reduced negative 
psychological symptoms and emotional reactivity, and improved behavioral 
regulation. The review ends with a discussion of the mechanisms of change 
underlying mindfulness interventions and go on to suggest future directions for 
research. 
 
Mystical Experiences  
 
Of all the positive, altered states of consciousness, mystical experiences are perhaps 
the most extraordinary and transformative. Already well explored by William James, 
his ‘Lectures XVI and XVII on Mysticism’ published in James (1902—R80) are as 
relevant and thoughtfully balanced as any contemporary writings on this subject. He 
begins by listing two main characteristics of such experiences: ineffability–a quality 
that must be directly experienced and defies expression, and noetic quality, which, 
to those who experience them, appears to give “insights into depths of truth 
unplumbed by the discursive intellect.” Two additional common qualities are 
transiency (they cannot be sustained for long periods), and passivity—although they 
can be facilitated by voluntary operations, once they set in, the experiencer no 
longer feels in control. He then reviews various reports of such states, including his 
own experimentation with nitrous oxide—which led him to the following famous 
conclusion:  
 
“It is that our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, 
is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the 
filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. 
We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the 
requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, 
definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of 
application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final 
which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to 
regard them is the question, for they are so discontinuous with ordinary 
consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish 
formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they 
forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. Looking back on my own 
experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help 
ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a 
reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and 
conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity.” (Ibid. p. 
388) 
 
At the same time, he notes that reports of mystical experiences from different 
cultural settings and practices vary widely in their details, and many extraordinary 
states with equal conviction to those who have them are reported in various forms 
of psychopathology. Given this, he evaluates the arguments for and against the 
apparent authority of mystical states, and concludes that, while non-mystics are 
under no obligation to accord them uncritical authority, one cannot deny their 
authority to those who have had them. Whichever view one takes, they demonstrate 
that “rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses 
alone” are only one kind of consciousness—and without an understanding of such 
states, no account of consciousness can be complete. 
 
In his comprehensive review of studies of mystical experience, David Wulff (2014—
R81) brings the literature up-to-date. He discusses the various definitions and 
historical antecedents of the term “mysticism”, introduced in the West in the mid 
18th Century to describe what most researchers (essentialists) would regard as a 
potentially universal (perennial) human experience, although some researchers 
(contextualists) stress that such experiences are heavily contextualized by language, 
tradition, discipline and culture. He provides illustrative examples, and reviews a 
range of typologies, e.g. those proposed by Otto, James and Stace, each with its 
associated set of characteristics. Wulff then reviews the after-effects of such 
experiences (a) as reported in the older literature and (b) in empirical studies. The 
first controlled experiment to evaluate the relationship of psychedelic to mystic-like 
experiences was carried out by Pankhe (1966). This studied the effects of psilocybin 
versus nicotinic acid administered to a group of 20 Protestant seminarians, in a 
chapel, listening to a 2.5 hour Good Friday service in the floor above the chapel. The 
effects, assessed after the service, suggested that the psilocybin group had 
experiences significantly closer to classical mystical ones than the nicotinic controls. 
In a 6-month follow-up, the experimental group confirmed their initial reports of 
having had mystic-like experiences, reported significantly more enduring positive 
changes in their attitudes and behaviour toward themselves, others, life, and the 
psilocybin experience itself than the control group. 25 years later, Doblin (1991) 
tracked down 7 of the experimental subjects and 9 of the controls, who confirmed 
both the differences in their remembered experiences and the continued differences 
in the associated after-effects.   
 
Government restrictions on the use and study of psychedelics prevented follow up 
experiments until the 1990s. However, Wulff reviews a series of more recent, well-
controlled, confirmatory experiments, initiated by Griffiths et al (2006—R83). He 
also briefly reviews reported associations between mystical experiences and 
parapsychological effects, their prevalence and predisposing factors, and their 
relation to psychopathological experiences, teasing out both their similarities and 
their important differences. He then turns to their therapeutic potential, for example 
in association with psychedelic drug therapy, extensively researched prior to the mid 
1960s and once more the subject of serious study (see below). In respect to this, 
Wulff also considers the clinical issues and risks, and turns finally to explanations—
ranging from neurophysiological explanations, psychoanalytic, analytic, humanistic 
and transpersonal interpretations, to perceptual-cognitive and contextual 
explanations. He ends with a discussion of methodological issues, for example the 
difficulty of fully studying such experiences from an entirely removed, external-
observer’s view. 
 
The Use of Drugs in the Transformation of Consciousness 
 
The use of mind-altering substances for recreational, ceremonial, ritual, shamanic, 
and religious purposes has ancient origins, however the potential use of such 
substances for the transformation of consciousness went through a step-change 
with the synthesis of LSD-25, by the Swiss pharmacologist, Albert Hoffman in 1938—
although its consciousness transforming properties were only noticed, accidentally, 
in 1943. In Hoffman (1980—R82) we include three chapters from LSD – My Problem 
Child (his autobiographical book), focusing on: ‘How LSD originated’; ‘The use of LSD 
in psychiatry’; and ‘LSD experience and reality’. In these he describes his accidental 
discovery of the consciousness-altering properties of LSD, his self-experiments, and 
the subsequent early uses of LSD in psychotytic, psycholytic, and psychedelic therapy, 
for example as an adjunct to psychoanalysis and other forms of psychotherapy—as 
well as a therapeutic aid in the dying process, for example with cancer patients who 
are terminally ill. He then recounts how his own LSD experiences changed his view of 
everyday reality to one in which “ … different realities, more correctly designated as 
different aspects of the reality, are not mutually exclusive but are complementary, 
and form together a portion of the all-encompassing, timeless, transcendental reality 
… ”. He then goes on to argue for the value of such experiences, particularly “… for 
the recovery of people in Western industrial societies who are sickened by a one-
sided, rational, materialistic world view”, encouraging a broadened worldview that is 
also open to the philosophies of the East.  
 
Once the mind-altering effects of LSD became evident, research into its potential 
medical and psychiatric uses flourished. By the mid 1960s, over 40,000 patients had 
taken LSD and psychedelic research had produced over 1,000 scientific papers, 
several dozen books, and six international conferences (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 
1981). However, fears about its uncontrolled, widespread use and potentially 
disruptive cultural effects led to a widespread ban on its use from 1967 onwards, 
even in restricted medical and scientific contexts for almost 40 years. In recent years 
however, restrictions have gradually eased, and research into the potential uses of 
the major psychedelics is once more beginning to develop. 
 
In a seminal study that helped to reintroduce the investigation of psychedelics to 
contemporary research Griffiths et al (2006—R83) extended Panke’s work on 
psilocybin, this time using methylphenidate hydrochloride, a psychoactive drug that 
produces subjective effects overlapping with those of psilocybin as a control in a 
repeated-measures, counterbalanced design. The study recruited 36 carefully 
selected participants, all high functioning, highly educated, and hallucinogen-naïve, 
who reported regular participation in religious or spiritual activities. Volunteers 
completed questionnaires assessing drug effects and mystical experience 
immediately after and 2 months after sessions. Community observers (family 
members, friends, or coworkers/colleagues at work) also rated changes in the 
volunteer’s attitudes and behavior. They found that psilocybin produced a range of 
acute perceptual changes, subjective experiences, and labile moods including 
anxiety. Psilocybin also increased measures of mystical experience, with 22 of the 36 
reporting a “complete” mystical experience after psilocybin compared to only 4 of 
the 36 doing so after the control. At 2 months, the volunteers rated the psilocybin 
experience as having substantial personal meaning and spiritual significance and 
67% of them rated the experience with psilocybin to be either the single most 
meaningful experience, or among the top five most meaningful experiences of their 
life. They also attributed to the experience sustained positive changes in their own 
attitudes and behavior, which were consistent with changes also noted by external 
observers in their community.  
 
In recent years, studies of the effects of psychedelics on brain dynamics have 
become highly technical and sophisticated. A good example is Carhart-Harris et al. 
(2016—R84), which employed three complementary neuroimaging techniques to 
study the effects of LSD. They found that arterial spin labeling (ASL), blood oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) measures, and magnetoencephalography (MEG) measures, 
during resting state conditions, revealed marked changes in brain activity after 
ingestion of LSD, which correlated strongly with its characteristic psychological 
effects.  For example, increased visual cortex cerebral blood flow (CBF), decreased 
visual cortex alpha power, and a greatly expanded primary visual cortex (V1) 
functional connectivity correlated strongly with ratings of visual hallucinations, 
implying that intrinsic brain activity exerts greater influence on visual processing in 
the psychedelic state, thereby defining its hallucinatory quality. However these 
visual cortex changes did not significantly correlate with the drug’s other 
characteristic effects on consciousness.  Rather, decreased connectivity (and 
therefore increased entropy) in the Default Network that normally operates to 
integrate the brains’ operations correlated strongly with ratings of “ego-dissolution” 
and “altered meaning,” implicating the importance of this particular circuit both for 
the maintenance of “self” or “ego” and for the processing of “meaning.” According 
to Carhart-Harris et al, this suggests that under LSD the brain reverts to a more 
‘primitive’ level of functioning (see also the expanded theoretical discussion in 
Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). 
 
In the final reading in this section David Presti (2017—R85) provides a succinct, well-
balanced review of the entire field of research on drugs that alter consciousness to 
produce arousal, sedation, sleep, anesthesia, analgesia, euphoria, amnesia, 
hallucinations, or psychedelic-like intensification of perceptions, thoughts, and 
feelings, by interacting in many complex ways with the receptor sites of 
neurotransmitters in the brain. He provides a detailed analysis of these interactions 
for a wide range of substances, from stimulants such as caffeine and cocaine, drugs 
that decrease arousal such as low-dose alcohol and the barbiturates, to general 
anesthetics and hypno-anesthetics. He then turns to widely used psychoactive drugs 
such as tobacco, arica nut (betel nut), opium, and cannabis, and the major 
psychedelics LSD, DMT, psilocin (and its pro-drug psilocybin), and mescaline. He also 
considers the actions of the ‘minor’ psychedelics, including MDMA, Salvia Divinorum 
and salvinorin A, the Amanita Muscaria mushroom, tropane alkaloids, delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol, ketamine, nitrous oxide, and carbogen. Presti then reviews 
contemporary research on the clinical uses of psychedelics which includes studies of 
the physiological and phenomenological effects of DMT; psilocybin for anxiety 
associated with terminal cancer, and for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder; LSD and MDMA for anxiety associated with life-threatening illness; MDMA 
for post-traumatic stress; psilocybin and LSD for severe headache; and ayahuasca, 
peyote, ibogaine, and psilocybin for addiction. While contemporary psychiatric 
pharmacology largely focuses on the utility of long-term daily use of medications 
labeled as anti-depressant, anti-psychotic, mood-stabilizing, or anxiolytic, 
psychedelic psychotherapy employs very limited (once, several times, or very 
sporadic) use of psychedelic substances to catalyze experiences that will have lasting 
therapeutic impact. In conclusion, Presti notes the ways in which modern 
neuroimaging techniques are beginning to reveal the action of the psychedelics on 
the brain—but suggests, as did William James, that the powerful experiences they 
foster “challenges us to be open to explanatory frameworks that go well beyond our 
current biophysical models of mind and reality.” 
 
Broader, Integrative Theories of Consciousness 
 
In the final section of this collection, we present five explanatory frameworks, each 
suggesting broader, integrated ways of understanding the phenomenology of, and 
processes supporting conscious experience, from different theoretical perspectives. 
 
Giulio Tononi and Christof Koch (2015—R86) provide a lucid review of Tononi’s 
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and its potential applications, 
which is currently attracting considerable interest in the search for the neural 
correlates of consciousness. They start with five phenomenological axioms that 
arguably characterise experience itself: intrinsic existence, composition, information, 
integration and exclusion. From these they derive five postulates about the 
properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. They argue 
that the theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of 
an individual experience (a quale), and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a 
particular physical system is conscious and of what. Moreover, they argue that IIT 
can explain a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes a number of testable 
predictions and extrapolates to a number of problematic conditions. The theory has 
panpsychist leanings, in that it holds that consciousness is a fundamental property 
possessed by physical systems having specific causal properties. It predicts that 
consciousness is graded, is common among biological organisms and can occur in 
some very simple systems. Conversely, it predicts that feed-forward networks, even 
complex ones, are not conscious, nor are aggregates such as groups of individuals or 
heaps of sand. Also, in sharp contrast to widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies 
that digital computers, even if their behaviour were to be functionally equivalent to 
ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would 
experience next to nothing.  	
Mark Solms (2016—R87) provides a persuasive case for a form of 
neuropsychoanalysis that integrates modern findings on the workings of the 
“cognitive unconscious” (see R24, R25, R26) with older, psychoanalytic theories 
about the workings of the “unconscious” proposed by Freud. Drawing on Freud's 
(1915—R18) essay on “The Unconscious”, he suggests ways of updating Freud's 
classical metapsychology in the light of recent developments in cognitive and 
affective neuroscience, thereby integrating Freud's concept of repression with 
contemporary notions of the cognitive - unrepressed - unconscious. He sets out his 
arguments under eight headings: most mental processes are unconscious; 
unconscious processes are automatized cognition; consciousness is endogenous 
(cognitive processes are served by phylogenetically ancient subcortical structures, 
and by the instinctual and affective processes associated with them); affect is always 
conscious; not all consciousness is declarative (affective consciousness and pre-
reflexive perceptual consciousness are not dependent on language); the systems 
underlying both conscious material (Cs) and potentially conscious material (PCs) are 
not themselves conscious. He then argues that repression is a form of premature 
automatisation, and concludes by summarising the ways in which Freud’s 
metapsychology needs to be updated to fit in with modern cognitive and affective 
neuroscience research. 
 
There is considerable interest in modern consciousness studies in how advances in 
physics might in some way illuminate our understanding of consciousness, for 
example by finding a place for consciousness in the operations of quantum 
mechanics (see Atmanspacher, 2015, for a useful review). Such endeavours are 
consonant with the ancient view that consciousness is in some way “basic” (see R3) 
and that quantum mechanics might provide some physical basis for the fundamental 
“unity” experienced in or underlying a range of extraordinary experiences (see R80, 
R81, R82, R88). Although speculative, some theories in this area have been 
elaborately developed (see, e.g. Hammeroff and Penrose, 2014), although, as yet, 
these have little direct application to psychological research.  
 
In contrast, Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts and Neves (2010) provide an extensive case for a 
macrocosmic psychophysical theory that integrates external world space-time, with 
neural space-time and the space-time of phenomenal experience in a way that 
relates neurobiological micro-operations to higher order electromagnetic fields that 
provide the binding of micro-activities into the fluid, integrated dynamic structures 
that might plausibly be the close correlates of phenomenal experiences. After a brief 
introduction to physical space and time, they give a very detailed, well-referenced 
review of the spatial–temporal activity of the brain at microscopic (neuronal), 
mesoscopic (neuronal assembly), and macroscopic levels (the relations between 
many neuronal assemblies)—and specify the ways in which the brain’s functional 
connectivity can be studied with EEG. They then review various ways of 
conceptualizing and measuring the spatial and temporal organization of phenomenal 
space, and go on to describe a form of  “Operational Architectonics” that allows an 
understanding of how the brain’s microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic 
functions combine to form an “operational space time” at the level of the brain’s 
electromagnetic fields that “parallel in a causal manner the patterns of phenomenal 
consciousness of different complexity during normal and pathological conditions.” 
They present evidence of ways in which the space-time of such fields can be 
isomorphic with phenomenal space-time and suggest how mental (subjective) space-
time, through brain operational space–time can be connected to the otherwise 
distant physical space–time reality. Overall, they interpret their explanatory 
framework as a form of dual-aspect monism in which the physical 
(neurophysiological) and mental (subjective) aspects of brain functioning are 
considered to be complimentary aspects of the same reality, rather than 
contradictory (see also R4, R26, R61, R64).1  
 
It is sobering to recall that for much of the materialist-reductionist 20th Century, the 
study of consciousness and even its existence was regarded with suspicion in 
psychology, regarded as “fringe” and even, during the behaviourist period, as 
pseudo-science. As many of the readings in this collection demonstrate, that era has 
long passed into history. However, the study of parapsychology and of extremely 
unusual human capacities commonly retains the mantle of being fringe and pseudo-
science, for the simple reason that such phenomena cannot be easily assimilated 
into a conventional materialist-reductionist worldview.  This field is nevertheless 
large, and in response to common scepticism, has developed increasingly rigorous 
methods. Edward Kelley (2015—R88) provides a thoughtful overview, drawing on 
psychological and neuropsychological evidence reviewed in depth and detail in 
Kelley, et al’s (2007) Irreducible Mind—an encyclopaedic 800-page, edited book. He 
begins with a summary of the prevailing physicalist conception of the brain/mind 
relationship and lists 10 areas of empirical research that challenge its adequacy: Psi 
phenomena; instances of extreme psychological influence (of the kind reviewed in 
R68, R69 and R70); cases of extreme human information processing capacity, 
precision, or depth; apparently well-authenticated cases of autobiographical, 
semantic, and procedural memories that survive bodily death (past-life memories, 
etc.); psychological automatisms and secondary centres of consciousness in humans 
that sometimes operate concurrently albeit outside the stream of conscious 
awareness; the presence of integrated experiences under conditions where the 
integration mechanisms proposed by current science are not operative, for example, 
in "near-death experiences", deep general anaesthesia, cardiac arrest, and coma, 
which all preclude normal “global workspace” operation; genius-level creativity that 
cannot be explained in terms of the normal operations of the conscious mind—
thereby implicating the operations of an unconscious or “subliminal” mind; mystical 
experiences (of the kind reviewed in R80 and R81); the nature of meaning and 
intentionality (being about something) which implies a being to whom experiences 
are meaningful or about something (rather than an entirely physical set of 
processes); and finally quantum mechanics, which challenges conventional 
physicalism (based on classical physics) at its roots. He argues, finally for a more 
inclusive theory that can accommodate such “rogue” phenomena, including for 
example an expanded understanding of the subliminal mind along the lines 
proposed by F. W H. Myers (see R17) and the panpsychist, pluralist or panentheist 
metaphysics that William James (1909) was trying to articulate in his mature work.  
 
In the final reading in this volume, Velmans (2012—R89) summarises some of the 
main features of Reflexive Monism (RM), a non-reductive philosophical framework 
for understanding consciousness developed in Velmans (2000, 2009) that provides 
an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among consciousness, 																																																								1	Unfortunately, the reprint cost of this article was too expensive to include in this collection. 
However, a prepublication version of it is available online at http://www.bm-
science.com/team/art61.pdf 
mind, brain and the external world in a way that both follows the contours of 
everyday experience and the findings of science. Starting with a non-reductive view 
of phenomenal consciousness that preserves its appearances (R23), RM presents a 
reflexive model of perception that takes account of the fact that, rather than being 
phenomenally located “in the head”, the contents of consciousness include the 
entire phenomenal world (see also R5, R58 and R60). It then develops a dual-aspect 
monist analysis of the relation of conscious experiences to their neural correlates, in 
which the nature of mind is viewed as a psychophysical form of information 
processing (see also R4, R61). From this one can derive both an epistemology for the 
study of consciousness (R61) and a non-dualist/non-reductionist understanding of 
the causal relations between consciousness and brain (R64—see also R21, R61, R67). 
The paper moves on to how conscious appearances relate to the complex, 
unconscious entities, events, and processes that give rise to those appearances, both 
in the brain (see R24, R25, R26, R18) and the surrounding, embedding world (see 
also R58, R59, R60). Interpreted broadly, this supporting ground can be thought of as 
an “unconscious ground of being” (see also R17, R19) from which material bodies, 
brains and associated conscious experiences arise, that can be explored both from a 
third-person perspective by the methods of science and from a personal, first-person 
perspective, for example through meditative and other introspective methods (see 
R58 to R63, R78, R79). This ground may also provide the source of the unitive 
aspects of mystical and other non-pathological, extraordinary experiences (R72, R73, 
R80, R81, R82, R83, R85), the unconscious interconnections suggested by some 
paranormal findings (R88), and a bridge between Western consciousness studies and 
some of the philosophies of the East (see Rao, 2011, and Velmans, 2013). The paper 
then demonstrates how this reflexive monist map can be used to evaluate the utility 
and resolve some of the oppositions of the many “isms” that currently populate 
consciousness studies. While no conventional, one-dimensional “ism” such as 
physicalism can do justice to this web of relationships, physicalism, functionalism, 
dualism, neutral monism, and dual-aspect monism can all be seen to provide useful 
ways of understanding different aspects of the relationships among consciousness, 
mind, brain and the external world when these are viewed in either a first- or a 
third-person way from within this web of relationships by sentient creatures such as 
ourselves. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these 
phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole.  
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